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Abstract 
 
 “Ungoverned spaces” are increasingly cited as a key threat to the U.S. government and its 
interests throughout the world. Often these spaces are seen as synonymous with failed states, or 
states that are unable to effectively exercise sovereignty. A primary goal of U.S. defense strategy 
now is to improve “effective sovereignty” in such areas, in order to deny sanctuary to terrorists, 
WMD proliferators, narco-traffickers, and gangsters. According to the World Bank, in 2006 the 
number of states lacking effective sovereignty rose to twenty-six, from eleven in 1996. The 
larger project that this paper is part of proposes to analyze the concept of ungoverned spaces and 
determine whether they really are ungoverned and constitute threats to states. The essential issue, 
we find, is not lack of governance, but rather who governs these spaces. This paper aims to 
develop a more accurate framework for understanding contemporary security threats in a world 
of softened sovereignty. An improved understanding of when and how alternative forms of 
governance shelter or encourage hostile non-state actors has important policy implications for 




“Ungoverned spaces” are increasingly cited as a key threat to the U.S. government and its 
interests throughout the world.2 Often these spaces are seen as synonymous with failed states, or 
states that are unable to effectively exercise sovereignty. A primary goal of U.S. defense strategy 
now is to improve “effective sovereignty” in such areas, in order to deny sanctuary to terrorists, 
WMD proliferators, narco-traffickers, and gangsters. According to the World Bank, in 2006 the 
number of states lacking effective sovereignty rose to twenty-six, from eleven in 1996.3    
 This paper analyzes the concept of ungoverned spaces to determine whether these areas 
are truly ungoverned. The essential issue, we find, is not lack of governance per se, but rather 
who governs these spaces. Governance de facto exists in areas frequently claimed as ungoverned 
spaces, such as feral cities, failed states, offshore financial markets, marginally regulated reaches 
of the internet, and tribal areas such as those found on the Afghan-Pakistan border, yet it is 
mostly exercised by non-state actors ranging from insurgencies to warlords to clans to private 
security providers. The notion of ungoverned spaces is potentially even more broadly applicable 
to legal, functional, virtual, and social arenas that either are not regulated by states or are 
contested by non-state actors and spoilers. In this project, we seek to explain when areas of 
“softened” sovereignty emerge, as well as the development of quasi-sovereign entities where the 
goods normally associated with states are instead provided by non-state actors. It is not just the 
decline of effective sovereignty that should interest us, but also how human beings construct 
alternative forms of governance in the absence of states. 
We also aim to develop a more accurate framework for understanding contemporary 
security threats in a world of softened sovereignty. In that sense, one of the outcomes of this 
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project is to determine the conditions in which governance or its lack poses a threat to security at 
three levels: human, national, and global. Ungoverned spaces are often viewed by states as 
threats because of their potential to provide havens for organized crime, terrorist movements and 
insurgencies, money laundering, illicit trafficking, and proliferation networks. An improved 
understanding of when and how alternative forms of governance shelter or encourage hostile 
non-state actors has important policy implications for how states, particularly the United States, 
prioritize their responses to emerging threats.  
This paper discusses some of the key concepts underpinning the current interest in 
ungoverned spaces, as well as the overarching context in which the questions of governance and 
security responses have emerged. This context is characterized by “complex interdependence” or 
a “multicentric world,” aided by the global diffusion of neoliberalism and sub- and transnational 
organizations, as well as the unspoken and contradictory assumption that territorial Western 
states of the mid-20th century are the benchmarks for sovereignty and world order in the 21st 
century. This context prevents states from “solving” the problems posed by ungoverned spaces, 
and at best allows for the management of ungoverned spaces through a variety of non-traditional 
mechanisms that engage subnational, regional, transnational, and international actors. At its core, 
the current concern about ungoverned spaces reflects the broader confusion among states about 
the nature of governance and the sources of world order in the post-Cold War world. 
 
<A> Why Do We Care About Ungoverned Spaces? 
 
Theoretically, the appearance of ungoverned spaces is a reflection of the decline in the 
effectiveness of states as political and social constructs. Preoccupation with this phenomenon is 
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broadly reflected across the recent literature on states, globalization, and governance, and it 
includes not only the disorder that attends failing states or civil wars, but also the withering of 
party systems as a vehicle for organizing public demands, and the progressive shrinking of the 
welfare state across the world as a mechanism for satisfying these demands. The decline of these 
institutions has important implications for the legitimacy of states as the predominant producers 
of governance. It also leads us to examine more closely the implications of phenomena such as 
the liberalization of the international economic order. Seen by Western liberal democracies as 
largely good in the economic realm, liberalization’s attendant softening of sovereignty has made 
it more questionable in the political arena. 
From a policy perspective, ungoverned spaces have attracted a great deal of attention 
from the U.S. government due to the perception that these areas, most recently conceptualized to 
include both physical territory and cyberspace, may shelter terrorist organizations and other 
criminal networks that pose a threat to national security. Government understandings of threat 
have evolved since the end of the Cold War, distinguishing areas that are differently governed, 
such as those under tribal rule, from those that pose a national security problem by providing 
safe havens for terrorists or insurgents because of an absence of governance.4 Clearly this 
approach has merit, since we can observe the activities of some terrorist organizations in quasi-
sovereign and sovereignty-free zones such as Lebanon, southern Colombia, and Somalia. 
International organizations, particularly the United Nations, have come to share some of these 
concerns because they are often called on to lead the international response to civil conflicts in 
ungoverned and contested spaces. We should also be cautious, however, when considering the 
implications of this policy trend, as some analysts are prone to produce extreme scenarios that 
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visualize the intersection of WMD proliferators, criminal organizations, and terrorists -- or other 
similar catastrophic networks -- to justify labeling all ungoverned spaces as potential threats.  
 
<A> What Are Ungoverned Spaces? 
 
The term “ungoverned spaces” is a misnomer. It originally arose from the state-centered 
conceptualization developed by many governments and international organizations confronting 
the apparent emergence following the Cold War of politically disordered territories in which 
state provision of governance goods had collapsed. Ungoverned spaces are viewed as social, 
political, and economic arenas where states do not exercise “effective sovereignty,” or where 
state control is absent, weak, or contested.5 In reality, many so-called ungoverned spaces are 
simply “differently” governed. These can range from tribal or clan-based governments in 
Somalia or Pakistani Waziristan, to areas ruled by persistent insurgencies such as the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), to major swathes of the internet controlled 
by corporate entities such as ICANN, or the creation of corporate transnational governance 
structures such as the lex mercatoria.6 It is not so much ungoverned spaces that should concern 
us, since these are effectively quite rare, but rather the contested spaces within and between 
states where other types of actors rule.7 Here we move from definitions of ungoverned spaces 
based on the absence of governance to a focus on the idea of “softened sovereignty” to connote 
the subordination of territorial state structures to some other authority. Ungoverned spaces, then, 
exist where territorial state control has been voluntarily or involuntarily ceded to actors other 
than the relevant legally recognized sovereign authorities. 
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 This conception of ungoverned spaces also serves to differentiate the focus of this project 
from the debate over fragile, failing, and failed states found in the academic and policy 
literature.8 While the weakening of the state clearly contributes to the phenomenon we seek to 
explain, whether it becomes a threat to the security of other states depends on what alternative 
actors arise to take the place of the state, and whether they produce an environment that threatens 
others. The attention to failed states is really the product of a 1990s concern with the 
consequences of the end of the Cold War, and the post-millenial fear that transnational terrorists 
may be using failed states as safe havens or staging areas.  
 We argue that this focus is too narrow because it misses the ungoverned spaces that exist 
in the international system, within otherwise consolidated states, and in new virtual domains. A 
broader definition of ungoverned spaces allows us to examine challenges to sovereignty posed 
by phenomena such as transnational actors. These include political entities such as 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations or terrorist networks, and economic ones 
such as major corporations or transnational criminal enterprises. It also allows us to examine the 
implications of lack of effective sovereignty within otherwise organized states, such as in border 
areas and inner cities of the United States and the suburban banlieus in France. In addition, it 
highlights the growing importance of virtual realms: politically as channels for terrorists, social 
movements, and political parties to mobilize, but also economically for new forms of corporate 
and international governance.  
More fundamentally, the current policy approach to ungoverned spaces rests on an 
underspecified conceptualization of “good governance” and “effective sovereignty” that appears 
to take the Western welfare state of the 20th century as its model and as the basis for global order 
in the 21st century.9 We maintain that such a view of sovereignty must be revised to place it 
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within a broad historical, evolutionary context that recognizes the Western welfare state as a 
form of political organization that arose out of specific political, ideological, and economic 
conditions. The revision should to take into account the effects of globalization (broadly 
construed) that pose fundamental challenges to well-established states in the West, let alone less-
developed states elsewhere, as well as to the concept of statehood and state sovereignty.10 
Moreover, the issue of governance and sovereignty must be viewed in a context of transnational 
relations that has altered the mix of actors that affect them. This context illuminates the limits of 
what states can, and cannot, do to manage potential threats that emerge from such spaces, as well 
as the extent to which such spaces are in fact threatening. 
 
<B> Challenging Traditional Understandings of Territorial Sovereignty and Statehood  
The concerns expressed about ungoverned spaces stem largely from the premise that 
territorial state sovereignty is the natural and right form of political organization that delineates 
and produces world order. Historically, however, territorial state sovereignty and territorial 
statehood are relatively recent phenomena. Territorial statehood and sovereignty originated in 
Western Europe in the 17th century, but only reached their apex in the early- to mid-20th century 
with the development of territorial states that were not only “effectively sovereign” in the 19th-
century legal sense of being able to police their own societies and repel attack, but also in the 
20th century socio-economic sense of providing public goods and services beyond security to 
their populations.  
 Other state-like forms of political organization had long existed outside of the West, 
whether in the form of suzerainty in China or the Mongol Khanate, but these were less focused 
on the hardened and contiguous frontiers that distinguished the European states, and represented 
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a more dispersed form of governance, with a core of central control that gradually diminished in 
the periphery.11 The European territorial state became “globalized” during the era of European 
imperialism and the creation of a global economy, when European governments imposed 
territorial state formations on their colonies around the world. As Christopher Clapham notes, 
“this resulted in the creation of a kind of state radically different from any that had existed 
before: a state whose territory, boundaries, and structure of government, and to a large extent 
economy and sometimes even population, were imposed and organized from outside….It also 
meant a hardening of the state -- in terms of fixed frontiers, citizenship rules, and hierarchical 
structures of government -- in ways that could create damaging tensions between the old form of 
state and the new.” He goes on to suggest that “the ‘problem’ of ‘failed states’ is most basically 
about whether the grafting of such states … onto unpromising rootstock can be made to take -- 
even with the various kinds of fertilizer provided by the international system in the form of 
universalist ideologies, incorporation into the global economy, and the provision of diplomatic 
and military support.”12  
 Recognition of the problems potentially posed by ungoverned spaces has led states to 
focus on “effective sovereignty” and “good governance” as remedies. For example, the U.S. 
government has identified increased governmental legitimacy, and legal, judicial, regulatory, 
security, law enforcement, intelligence, and public service capacity and economic opportunity as 
important means to combat threats from ungoverned spaces.13 These requirements reflect the 
classic territorial, rule of law, legitimacy, and interventionist dimensions of the Western state of 
the mid-20th century.14 The territorial dimension encompasses control over the use of force, 
revenues, and resources -- in other words, the 19th century European conception of “effective 
sovereignty,” in which states were only sovereign when they could levy the resources to protect 
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themselves effectively from external or internal threats to their rule.15 The rule of law generally 
embraces the notion of “good governance,” or the institutions of law, courts, oversight, and 
transparency that make up a Rechtsstaat or “constitutional state.” The legitimacy dimension 
reflects the notion that states are responsible to their publics, and requires a political community 
of citizens loyal to both the state and its laws. The interventionist dimension denotes the 20th 
century requirement for state provision of public welfare through the promotion of economic 
growth and social equality.16 The slew of existing programs to build state institutions and 
capacities -- funded by government and intergovernmental organization -- attests to the common 
assumption that strengthening states is the primary solution for a range of global and local ills, 
such as insurgencies, ideological militancy, human trafficking, nuclear and narcotics smuggling, 
corruption, and underdevelopment. There is less recognition, however, that such efforts today are 
complicated by constraints globalization has imposed on the states doing the “grafting.” 
 
<A> How Do Ungoverned Spaces Come About? 
 
Ungoverned spaces are most commonly thought to result from entropy and civil conflict. 
The wars that have taken place since the end of the Cold War in the republics of the former 
Yugoslavia, the Horn of Africa, and Afghanistan are all illustrative of the failed and failing state 
phenomenon and its production of contested and uncontrolled spaces. In particular, the 
reordering of the international system following the Cold War clearly disrupted governing 
coalitions in certain conflict-prone regions and altered the cost-benefit calculation made by local 
political leaders regarding the use of force. This in turn led to increased contestation for power in 
some already weak states.17 Neglect, carelessness, and errors committed by major powers during 
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the transition in the international system also have contributed to conflicts. The consequences of 
such behavior drove major powers and leadings intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to 
consider mechanisms for ameliorating or suppressing civil conflict during the 1990s. The result 
was a major expansion of the U.N.’s peacekeeping role, significant changes in NATO’s attitude 
towards out-of-area missions, and the mobilization of transnational civil society to address 
emerging and festering crises. The 9/11 attacks have only reinforced this attitude within the 
global policy community, fostering a more tolerant attitude towards external intervention in 
conflict zones. Ungoverned spaces, however, are also the unintended consequences of recent 
transnational phenomena such as globalization.  
 
<B> Post-Statist Governance? Globalization and Contested Authority 
The questions of whether globalization has fatally weakened states and the international 
states-system, and whether we already have entered a post-statist world order, continue to spark 
debate among scholars. If we wish to understand how and when ungoverned spaces may pose 
threats to states, this debate raises the issue of whether the context of globalization has 
fundamentally altered states’ willingness and ability to effectively govern along the four 
dimensions outlined above, even in the most developed states, including the United States.18 
Leading states have sought to promote economic liberalization and democratization as global 
goods, but ironically, these very efforts have helped open spaces for non-state actors to contest 
state authority. In fact, the governance goods traditionally provided by states, such as security, 
laws, and welfare, may now be provided by local or transnational actors. Powerful domestic 
constituencies within the leading powers support the expansion of this new liberal democratic 
international order and are hostile to sovereignty-strengthening measures, such as greater 
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oversight of transnational trade and finance, or greater restrictions on the activities of civil 
society. Has the group of forces lumped under the rubric of globalization changed the sources 
and modes of governance to such an extent that the premise of governance by territorial states -- 
even within the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development -- is neither realistic 
nor achievable?19 If so, then “ungoverned spaces” -- in the sense that primacy of territorial state 
control is lacking -- become ubiquitous and territorial sovereignty anomalous. In such 
circumstances, efforts to establish or re-establish territorial sovereignty will likely have 
considerable second- and third-order consequences.  
 Much of the answer hinges on whether one believes that territorial states -- at least the 
most powerful ones -- are the managers of globalization, who use transnational and subnational 
forces to further their interests in an open global economy and neoliberal world order, or that 
transnational and subnational actors and forces have enmeshed territorial states in a complex web 
of interdependencies that they neither wish to nor can fully disrupt or control.20 From the 
perspective of realists and Marxists, globalization is business as usual: powerful states pursuing 
their national interests and capitalistic ends.21 While there is little dispute that powerful states 
have had a major hand in creating globalization, many suggest that these states no longer can 
control the forces they helped unleash.22 Powerful states created “virtual” ungoverned spaces in 
the areas of off-shore finance and information communications. These areas now have powerful 
non-state actors, in addition to states themselves, committed to ensuring a continued lack of 
regulation, and may well be beyond the ability of their creators to assert control.23 For James 
Rosenau, globalization has meant that authority is increasingly disaggregating into a rapidly 
growing number of centers at every level of community, creating a multicentric world.24 In such 
a view, efforts to protect national security through unilateral interventions in “ungoverned” 
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spaces are likely to prove counter-productive, and the instrumental use of international and non-
governmental organizations to be considerably more difficult.  
 
<B> Softened Sovereignty and Governance 
The current condition of what we call “softened sovereignty” arises from several 
historical waves of ideological globalization pushed by powerful Western states that 
revolutionized the forms of political-economic organization around the world. Each impelled a 
contest of authorities between new and old. As noted above, the territorial state system created in 
Europe over the 17th to 19th centuries was exported during the first wave of European 
colonization, culminating in the creation of de jure sovereign territorial states throughout the 
world from World War II to 1974 and the onset of decolonization. The period of decolonization 
was informed by the liberal ideology of sovereign equality, establishing territorial states that 
were equal in law, regardless of their size, power, ethnic coherence, or effectiveness in governing 
their populace, thus setting up the conditions for many of the contested territorial spaces we see 
today in Palestine, Pakistan, and Africa.25 After the Second World War, facing an encroaching 
communist ideology, the United States led the way in establishing the political foundations for a  
liberal economic order, premised on the right of all populaces to state-provided social welfare, 
while at the same time promoting an open international economic system. By the 1990s, a more 
reflexively capitalistic neoliberal economic ideology largely replaced this “embedded” or social 
democratic liberalism. In so doing, it created a contest of authorities between territorial states, 
their polities, and economic actors, in which the territorial state retreated in the face of economic 
pressure from multinational entities, shrinking its social welfare functions and loosening its 
control of national resources.26 The global diffusion of neoliberalism also altered the 
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international trading and financial orders, to produce a form of political economy in which 
private actors were given tremendous power to govern themselves.27 In the second half of the 
20th century and accelerating in the 1990s, a wave of liberal humanism challenged the theory of 
liberal equality that had enshrined territorial states, regardless of regime type, as the proper 
vessels of sovereignty. Instead, powerful Western states advocated the universal superiority of 
their construct of human rights over local cultures and territorial sovereignty, prompting a 
contest of authorities between a liberal pluralism that accepted the de jure equality of sovereign 
states, non-Western ideologies of rights, and anti-pluralist liberal humanism.28  
 In short, these waves of liberalism have first imposed the concept of territorial statehood 
and sovereignty and then undermined it, producing the “softened sovereignty” of today in which 
even the most capable states must contend with the interests of private actors in their efforts to 
govern. Western liberal imperialism created contested territorial spaces. Western embedded, and 
then neoliberal, ideology brought about contested authorities -- contested control of the 
economy, polity and society -- and retreat of the territorial state. Western liberal humanism 
created the contending authorities of universal liberal values (anti-pluralist liberalism, liberal 
pluralism, and non-Western ideologies of rights). Western liberalism created the criteria for 
“good governance” that states are expected to adhere to today, while at the same time 
undermining the ideological legitimacy and institutional capacity of state authority. In Richard 
Falk’s words, “territorial sovereignty is being diminished on a spectrum of issues in such a 
serious manner as to subvert the capacity of states to control and protect the internal life of 
society, and non-state actors hold an increasing proportion of power and influence in the shaping 
of world order.”29 The result is a world in which state authority is neither absolute, exclusive, or 
necessarily primary. These waves of globalization have brought about contending authorities not 
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just territorially, as in the case of Hezbollah and the Lebanese state, but among national and local 
governments, local and transnational corporations, and non-governmental organizations and 
international organizations.  
We should also keep in mind that states have deliberately created ungoverned spaces or 
accepted softened sovereignty when it suits their purposes. Sometimes this is done for diplomatic 
reasons, such as the ungoverned spaces that have existed along Saudi Arabia’s borders with 
Yemen and Iraq, where none of the parties exercised effective sovereignty as a means to avoid 
diplomatic tensions over contested boundaries. Similarly, disputed territories along the 
Salvadoran-Honduran border were allowed to remain ungoverned during the 1980s (even though 
they formed convenient rear areas for insurgents), because the government of El Salvador 
wanted to avoid a resurgence of the tensions that had led to the 1969 Soccer War with its 
neighbor. States also deliberately foster ungoverned virtual spaces, such as offshore financial 
institutions.30 By strictly enforcing banking secrecy laws, many small states have been able to 
attract a lucrative financial services sector that provides high-paying jobs where few alternatives 
are available. Competition among these states to provide such spaces has in turn led to the 
development of an extensive off-shore banking network that is used for all manner of legal and 
nefarious purposes. Major powers (and their courts) have traditionally tolerated such spaces 
because they allow intelligence agencies to move money invisibly, corrupt politicians and 
businesspeople to hide questionable gains, and even legitimate enterprises to structure their 
financial transactions to minimize taxes and improve international competitiveness. The slow 
progress made by the global financial community in regulating these centers since 9/11, despite 
the official concern given to terrorist financing networks, suggests that such ungoverned spaces 
can generate powerful constituencies that will lobby for their continued existence.31 
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<A> When Are Ungoverned Spaces a Threat? To Whom? 
 
Most of the interest in the U.S. policy community regarding ungoverned spaces is driven 
by the perception that they are a threat to national security because they are the rear areas in 
which hostile non-state actors, principally terrorists and insurgents, can organize, recruit, train, 
and recuperate. Military operations in Afghanistan, Waziristan, and Somalia have clearly been 
justified with this threat perception in mind. The potential threats emanating from ungoverned or 
contested spaces, however, pose threats at two other levels: that of the international system, and 
that of human beings and human security. 
 The focus on ungoverned spaces as a danger first emerged during the 1990s when they 
were seen as a threat to global governance and the emerging liberal international economic order. 
The great human toll of conflicts in contested spaces in states such as the Congo, Cambodia, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Lebanon prompted many states and international government 
organizations to focus on the threat posed by ungoverned spaces. Disorder, particularly from 
civil war or failed states, was seen as dangerous for global good governance. Contested spaces 
thus threatened the stability of neighboring states by subjecting them to destabilizing refugee 
flows and criminal networks allied with warring parties in the conflict, but they were also 
perceived as threats to the norms that were supposed to underpin good governance in the 
international system, such as respect for human rights.32  
Many states have had to contend with internal dissent, persistent insurgencies, and 
organized crime, yet in this volume we argue that these phenomena should be considered part of 
a continuum of potential threats posed by ungoverned spaces, in this case threats to human 
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security. In extreme cases, the state’s inability to provide personal and economic security may 
lead citizens to turn to non-state actors to provide such security. Ironically, while the emergence 
of a vibrant civil society is seen as a hallmark of modern developed democracies, the withering 
away of states due to globalization or liberalization has in some cases empowered non-state 
actors to the extent that they exercise quasi-sovereign authority over the persons within their 
domain. In addition, the weakening of the state and its ability to provide security and welfare has 
led citizens to accept alternatives to the western liberal international order: for example, populist 
governments in Latin America, the Hezbollah insurgency in Lebanon, and Vladimir Putin’s 
increasingly authoritarian regime in Russia. 
We should also be clear that alternative forms of government and alternative governing 
actors may be perceived as threats to states even in cases where there is no threat to global 
governance, national security, or public safety. Hundreds of millions of persons across the globe 
depend on states for their livelihoods. If alternative forms of governance are able to provide 
state-like goods such as security and well-being to those within their domain more effectively 
than governments, then it is only natural to assume that loyalty will follow. States have 
traditionally been able to command loyalty not only for normative or aspirational reasons, but 
also because the security, regulatory, and judicial bureaucracies have been the most effective 
protection racket available.33 If only from an evolutionary perspective, it is normal to expect that 
all states will perceive ungoverned spaces as threatening, even if they contain no threats. Their 
very existence represents the potential for the emergence of competitive forces, and thus 
threatens the livelihoods of the millions of bureaucrats that make up the state. Nevertheless, it is 
not clear that ungoverned spaces always produce a threat to states, and we will attempt a more 
nuanced assessment of when ungoverned spaces become threats at the conclusion to this volume. 
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We should also expect the concern over ungoverned spaces has led to a shift in attitudes 
towards sovereignty across governments and international organizations. This may have 
potentially wide-reaching consequences for the state system. The international community’s 
experiences in rebuilding states after civil conflicts and humanitarian and human rights disasters 
have helped further weaken the norm of juridical sovereignty, and made it easier to justify 
intervention in states that lack effective sovereignty over their national territory. International 
debate over intervention in the Darfur conflict in Sudan is only the most recent example of how 
this attitude has spread to include not only governments but transnational civil society. Calls for 
a norm of “contingent sovereignty” at the UN that would differentiate among nations according 
to the nature of their regimes emphasize the direction of this shift, with all its implications for 
international security.34  
 
<A> Conclusions: State and International Responses to Ungoverned Spaces? 
 
Although academic and policy interest in ungoverned spaces, whether they are territorial, 
liminal, or virtual, has grown since the end of the Cold War, these spaces have existed since the 
inception of the modern nation-state.35 In fact, much of the early process of state formation in 
Europe was concerned with bringing small state-like entities under the control and authority of 
sovereign modern states. Similar arguments can be made about European colonial projects to 
reorder spaces around the globe that were not governed by states (at least as they were known in 
Europe) into entities under their sovereignty. The decolonization and anti-imperialist projects of 
leaders in the developing world in the post-World War II period also took state building as a 
paradigm for the new postcolonial entities. Lamentations of the weakness of states in the 
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developing world, their lack of control over national territory, and their inability to exercise 
authority are common among scholars of comparative and international politics, but few of these 
observers take seriously non-state alternatives to governance.36  
Even though the success of the modern state-building project around the world has come 
into question with the proliferation of ungoverned spaces, the fact remains that states and 
international governmental organizations remain distinctly reluctant to conceive of or sanction 
alternatives to states for the provision of governance. All departures from such modes of 
territorial authority have been temporary or involuntary, as occurred in Kosovo or Cambodia or 
Lebanon, and were designed to eventually produce renewed, stronger states. International 
assistance to ungoverned spaces has typically been designed to rebuild state authority. The 
United States alone spends hundreds of millions of dollars to strengthen the capacity of states 
around the world to provide governance, including international military education and training, 
counter-terrorism assistance, anti-narcotics assistance, programs designed to strengthen the rule 
of law, and even traditional economic and military aid.37 Similar programs are supported by 
other major powers such as Japan and the European Union. Even China, in its pursuit of greater 
access to raw materials in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America, has stepped up its offers of 
assistance, almost exclusively to states. In policy terms, this reluctance to countenance 
alternatives to states has led to questionable policies of unchecked support for particular state 
leaders, such as Mikhail Gorbachev during the last years of the Soviet Union, or General Pervez 
Musharaff of Pakistan more recently. Leading powers will go to almost any lengths to keep 
particular allied leaders in power over their states, even if these are failing or weak, for fear of 
the alternatives that may arise if they are deposed. 
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This push to keep states at the center of the provision of governance is, however, in 
tension with much of liberal globalization. The extension of neoliberalism during the 1990s 
brought a new approach to governance that was designed to downsize and privatize much of the 
state. This goes beyond the decline of the welfare state, but in many ways includes a critique of 
other aspects of state spending on development and security. This conceptualization still 
concedes that states are the fundaments of the international order, but only accepts a limited 
scope for them. Taken to its logical conclusion, the effect of the extension of civil society, 
democratization, globalization, and liberalization is to progressively limit the state to a “night 
watchman” function in which almost all governance falls outside the state. Instead of a central 
government, domestic and transnational civil society and corporations are to step into this gap, 
empowered to provide governance-like functions.38 It should be no surprise that by doing so, 
some civil society and corporate entities are able to capture the loyalty of the populations they 
serve. 
Certain recent trends suggest that state resistance to non-state provision of governance 
may be eroding. Certainly in virtual ungoverned spaces, such as the internet, there has been 
much greater creativity in constructing non-state alternatives to governance. In certain regions of 
the world, non-state actors have provided state-like functions for extended periods of time, either 
because states are too weak, or the threat is too minor to seriously engage the full attention of the 
great powers. Hezbollah in Lebanon, the FARC in Colombia, and the operations of the Mara 
Salvatrucha in the urban spaces of El Salvador and Honduras, all serve to confirm this trend. 
Transnational civil society often plays a key role in building governance structures in contested 
areas, including participating in the administration of refugee camps or providing health and 
development assistance directly to target populations, rather than through the states that 
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nominally have sovereignty over them. This even extends to traditionally core state functions, 
such as defense. The privatization of security and the growth of private military corporations 
suggest that non-state alternatives to the provision of force at a level traditionally reserved to 
states will become more common. Certainly, the boast by the Blackwater USA corporation that it 
could assemble a peacekeeping brigade for operations in the Darfur region of Sudan is one 
example of the growth of private military power.39 The use of private entities by states and 
international government organizations to provide governance-like functions in contested and 
uncontrolled areas, whether it is mercenary forces operating as peacekeepers or NGOs 
administering healthcare in refugee camps, may in fact be the wave of the future. 
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